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RELIGION AND THE SEARCH FOR A 
PRINCIPLED MIDDLE GROUND ON 
ABORTION 
Michael W. McConnell* 
THE PoLmcs OF VIRTUE: Is ABORTION DEBATABLE? By Elizabeth 
Mensch and Alan Freeman. Durham: Duke University Press. 1993. 
Pp. x, 268. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $14.95. 
I 
Religious arguments and movements have been central to virtually 
every important public debate in American history from independence 
and abolition to civil rights and the nuclear freeze. Nonetheless, many 
legal theorists claim that this involvement of religion with politics 
presents a problem for our constitutional order. Recently, religious 
voices have played a prominent role in the controversy over abortion 
- especially, though not exclusively, on the anti-abortion side. This 
has generated a surge of new writing about the role of religion in pub-
lic life. In the most serious entry in the field, John Rawls maintains 
that a society may justly base its laws only on a "reasonable" political 
conception of justice, meaning a conception that is, or can be, "shared 
by citizens regarded as free and equal" and that does not presuppose 
any particular "comprehensive doctrine,'' of which religious doctrine 
is a prime example.1 Applying this idea to the abortion issue, Rawls 
concludes (without much discussion) that "any comprehensive doc-
trine that leads to a balance of political values excluding" the right to 
an abortion by a "mature adult" woman in the first trimester "is to 
that extent unreasonable,'' because the "political value of the equality 
of women is overriding."2 This means, apparently, that the contrary 
balance - treating the life of the unborn as the "overriding value" -
is not just wrong but beyond the boundaries of reasonable argument, 
in part because it rests on a "comprehensive doctrine" (though why 
respect for unborn life rests on a comprehensive doctrine while respect 
for the equality of women does not is something of a mystery).3 
• William B. Graham Professor of Law, University of Chicago. B.A. 1976, Michigan State; 
J.D. 1979, University of Chicago. - Ed. The author wishes to thank Martha Nussbaum for 
comments on an earlier draft. 
1. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 176 (1993) (reviewed in this issue by Professor 
Joshua Cohen - Ed.). 
2. Id. at 243 n.32. 
3. Admittedly, Rawls's book is not about abortion, and his comments on the issue are con-
fined to a lengthy footnote. Presumably he would have more to say if he chose to say it. This, 
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In a more rhetorical vein, Ronald Dworkin, having concluded that 
opposition to abortion has "at least a quasi-religious nature," goes on 
to tell us that "it is no part of the proper business of government" to 
enforce laws based on such premises.4 "[l]t is a terrible form of tyr-
anny, destructive of moral responsibility, for the community to impose 
tenets of spiritual faith or conviction on individuals."5 Note that this 
position does not depend on the character of the rules regulating abor-
tion; judgments based on "tenets of spiritual faith" are simply ex-
cluded from public discourse. Anthony Lewis, a respected New York 
Times columnist, has written that the "essential truth about most anti-
abortion activists" is that they are "religious fanatics, who want to 
impose their version of God's word on the rest ofus."6 This puts them 
outside the bounds of "our form of democracy, which requires com-
promise and does not work when there are ideological certainties."7 
Again, one might ask: How willing are advocates of the opposite side 
to compromise? Are there not "ideological certainties" in secular 
political discourse? Nor are arguments of this sort confined to writers 
and academics. Popular pro-choice rhetoric commonly brands reli-
gious thought about abortion intolerant, extremist, and illegitimate. 8 
In the language of street protests: "Keep your rosaries out of our 
ovaries!" 
Come now Elizabeth Mensch and Alan Freeman, professors of law 
at SUNY-Buffalo and close students of the religious debate over abor-
tion in the United States in the past forty years. No one will accuse 
Mensch and Freeman of being members of the religious right. As fem-
inists and early enthusiasts of the critical legal studies movement, with 
backgrounds in left Protestantism (Mensch) and Judaism (Freeman), 
they would seem unlikely voices to rise in defense of religious dis-
course about abortion and other contentious issues of public morality 
and policy. The book is all the more striking for their disclosure in the 
introduction that each of them has had "more than one firsthand expe-
rience of abortion" (p. 3). This experience they describe as "almost 
perfect irresponsibility, of the kind that absolutely precludes self-right-
eousness" (p. 3). These authors have produced a book that is by far 
however, makes the comments all the more perplexing, for Rawls - an apparently careful and 
open-minded scholar - is willing to dismiss the opinions of a quarter of the population as be-
yond the pale of reason on the strength of nothing more than a few conclusory sentences in a 
footnote. 
4. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 15 (1993) (reviewed in this issue by Professor 
Alexander Capron - Ed.). 
5. Id. 
6. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: Right to Life, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at A29. 
7. Id. 
8. For numerous examples of such comments, as well as epithets flowing in the opposite 
direction, see JAMES D. HUNTER, CuLTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 143-
56 (1991). See also STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CuLTURE OF DISBELIEF (1993) (reviewed in this 
issue by Professor Sanford Levinson - Ed.). 
May 1994] The Search for a Middle Ground on Abortion 1895 
the most comprehensive yet concise, sympathetic yet critical, account 
of theological thought on the issue of abortion. 
Their heterodoxical conclusion is that religious thinking about 
abortion - which was interrupted by the constitutional close out of 
Roe v. Wade 9 - was more nuanced, less absolutist, more tolerant of 
good-faith disagreement, more closely attuned to the moral percep-
tions of the people, and more conducive to compromise than the secu-
lar constitutional discourse that replaced it. But this conclusion is not, 
like most theorizing on the subject, based on a priori conceptions. The 
book is not really an argument at all, but simply a description of the 
debate as it unfolded in the churches and synagogues of America be-
tween the end of World War II and the decision in Roe. Far from 
being divorced from public values, this discourse, according to 
Mensch and Freeman, was the prime forum for deliberation about 
public values. The book thus transcends the specific issue of abortion 
and addresses the process of forming moral judgments in our pluralis-
tic democracy. "The larger question," the authors say, "is whether we 
can recover a meaningful public moral vocabulary" (p. 5). The "al-
chemical fantasy of liberalism - that process can tum itself into sub-
stance - is belied by the reality of conflict" (p. 5; footnote omitted). 
Their book, The Politics of Virtue: Is Abortion Debatable?, poses the 
question: "Can a revival of theological traditions . . . serve such an 
enterprise?" (p. 5). 
If Mensch and Freeman were to engage Rawls in conversation, I 
think they would agree with his first criterion of reasonableness (that 
public debate must be based on conceptions that are, or can be, 
"shared by citizens regarded as free and equal"10), but they would 
maintain that one is most, not least, likely to find such discussion in 
theological circles. The various communities of faith have been en-
gaged in discourse about morality and public justice for centuries and 
have produced most of the bedrock of modem ethics - even ethics 
that appears, on the surface, strictly secular. As the authors point out, 
the secular systems of Hume and Kant presupposed the survival of 
Calvinist (Hume) or Lutheran (Kant) substantive ethics, even as they 
undermined the epistemological basis of the religious world view (p. 
153). Moreover, there is something odd about Rawls's argument in a 
nation in which religion is so important to so many people. Three-
fourths of American women and a lesser proportion of American men, 
the authors point out, "report that they consider religious faith the 
most important influence on their lives" (p. 4). Can we honestly re-
gard our fellow citizens as "free and equal" if we rule out-of-bounds 
the reasons they conscientiously adopt as a ground for their thinking 
about public issues? 
9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
10. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 176. 
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The moral teachings of the major religions of America are starting 
points for serious deliberation in which any person - believer and 
nonbeliever alike - can engage. By contrast, the authors observe, 
most secular discussion of abortion since Roe has been strident, acri-
monious, and largely unilluminating. Rawls's own dismissal of the 
pro-life position as "unreasonable" and not requiring further discus-
sion is a sobering example of a secular "close out" - not different, in 
principle, from those who say, "The Bible says it, I believe it, and that 
resolves it." 
I think, however, that Mensch and Freeman would disagree with 
Rawls's second criterion (that positions in the debate must not presup-
pose a particular comprehensive doctrine). It is only the traditions 
built on comprehensive doctrine - secular as well as religious - that 
have anything useful to say about ultimate questions such as life and 
death, freedom and obligation, and the proper reaches of justice and 
compassion. If we do not include comprehensive doctrines in our dis-
cussions, we will be left with nothing but sterile proceduralism and 
moral assertions uprooted from their source and foundation. 
Perhaps the most distinctive virtue of religious participation in 
public life, according to the authors, is that religion places the con-
cerns and the powers of this world in proper perspective - they are 
important, but not controlling: 
Religion in the United States provides both an incentive to act respon-
sibly in the world, and it also offers that "pause" which makes complete 
allegiance to any political order impossible. This is why religion pro-
vides a counterforce to totalizing secular ideologies, whether of the right 
or left - so long, that is, as churches resist the temptation to identify 
themselves too fully with the state. [p. 149] 
This book should be required reading for anyone who wishes to 
contend that religious participation in resolving issues of public con-
cern is inconsistent with our national commitment to free, open-
minded debate and inquiry. 
II 
Quite apart from their analysis of the abortion question, Mensch 
and Freeman have provided an insightful primer into the intellectual 
history of political theology in postwar America. The authors discuss 
the natural law tradition that flourished in the aftermath of the Holo-
caust and Nuremberg but floundered in the conflicts of the 1960s; the 
ecumenical spirit of the 1950s, with its tendency toward complacency 
in the public sphere; the profound, but profoundly misunderstood, 
theology of Barth and Bonhoeffer, which inspired Martin Luther King 
and led to the social activism of mainstream Protestant churches in 
the civil rights era; the emergence of fundrunentalist Christianity from 
its pietistic cocoon into a powerful public voice; the secularization of 
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mainstream Protestantism; and the growing division between con-
servative and liberal theological movements in the years before and 
after Roe. To anyone unfamiliar with these developments, the book 
serves as an excellent introduction; but even to those well versed in the 
period, the book is studded with often surprising insights - especially 
in drawing connections between theological developments and parallel 
developments in jurisprudential thought. Much of this interest arises 
from the authors' own quirky point of view. The overall impression 
the book conveys is one of great fair-mindedness, but this is accom-
plished, not by a dispassionate and "objective" recital of the various 
positions, but rather by a sympathetic engagement with each. 
The authors concentrate on four great traditions: natural law (par-
ticularly associated with Roman Catholicism but not exclusive to it), 
Reformed Protestantism (especially as informed by the life and teach-
ings of Barth and Bonhoeffer), Protestant fundamentalism (which 
shades over into evangelicalism more broadly), and liberal (what they 
call "secularized") Protestantism. In the final chapters of the book, 
they describe the way in which these theological traditions interacted 
in the late 1960s - before Roe - to produce a rich and promising 
discourse about abortion (pp. 98-125). Their treatment of these issues 
is both thoughtful and well informed. It is, however, uneven. There is 
no sustained discussion of JeWish thought: some individual Jewish 
thinkers, such as Edmond Cahn, are included, but not in the context 
of an account of Jewish theological ethics. Within Christian thought, 
the discussion of the Protestant tradition is richer and more interesting 
than that devoted to Roman Catholicism. Oddly, Catholic thinking is 
most prominently, though not exclusively, represented by philoso-
phers A.P. d'Entreves and Jacques Maritairi and law professor and 
now appellate judge John Noonan, rather than by ecclesiastics or theo-
logians. There is only limited discussion of official Church pronounce-
ments on the relation between religious teaching and public policy in 
general, or on abortion in particular. 
More specifically, the authors neglect any discussion of the impor-
tant question of authority within the Catholic Church and whether -
as critics of the Church maintain - the special claim of the Church 
hierarchy to teaching authority binding to some extent on the con-
sciences of faithful Catholics is problematic within our constitutional 
order. Instead, Mensch and Freeman concentrate on the substance of 
Catholic ethical theology, observing that "[i]f theological argument is 
to play a valuable role in public debate, it must appeal not to privi-
leged authority but to some version of the common good, as Catholic 
tradition has in fact recognized" (p. 5). This might seem to beg the 
question, because "appeals to privileged authority" and "versions of 
the common good" are not logically exclusive categories. There 
might, after all, be reasons grounded in the common good for recog-
nizing privileged authority - for example, that of the Constitution 
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and its Framers, the common law, the long-standing customs and tra-
ditions of the people, and so on. But the authors do not pursue the 
problem. 
The authors' analysis of these four traditions exposes a paradox, 
which I have not seen remarked upon in any of the theoretical discus-
sions of the role of religion in politics. The paradox is this: the most 
sectarian and nonrationalist of the religious movements - that arising 
from Barth and Bonhoeffer - is also the most nuanced, uncategorical, 
and nondogmatic on the subject of abortion, as well as the most intel-
lectually compatible with postmodern theory and political praxis. 
Mensch and Freeman note that "the Catholic natural law tradition 
has been successfully universalized," losing, as a result, "its distinctly 
Christian character," and that, by contrast, "the ethics of serious Ref-
ormation theology can sound stubbornly sectarian, too peculiarly 
Christian to have any relevance to the world outside the Christian 
church" (p. 48). 
This observation warrants particular attention, because natural 
law has been widely misunderstood.11 Natural law, in the Catholic 
tradition, is a species of divine law - as all law is ultimately divine in 
its source and authority - but can be discerned through the applica-
tion of natural reason to the world around us. Natural law stands in 
contradistinction to revealed law. Even in the Middle Ages, as the 
authors explain, natural law theorists "did not depend on revela-
tion .... Aquinas had carefully stated that the divine law, revealed 
through grace, perfects, but does not overturn, the human law that is 
based on natural reason" (p. 35). Thus, while some subjects - the 
authors give the example of "a proper understanding of the Trinity" 
(p. 35) - depend on revelation, "for most affairs of the world, natural 
reason would suffice" (p. 35). A prohibition on genocide, for example, 
can be "rooted in an understanding of the nature and purpose of hu-
manity that is accessible to natural reason alone" (p. 35). 
This distinction is crucial to the question of public discourse, be-
cause Christians were not thought to have any privileged position with 
regard to natural reason; indeed, their great authority on many ques-
tions of natural law was the pagan philosopher Aristotle. Natural law 
thinking is therefore, in Rawls's terminology, something that can be 
"shared by citizens regarded as free and equal."12 That does not 
mean, of course, that everyone will agree with the premises of natural 
law thinking. Much of modem positivist ethics is based on the cate-
11. For example, during the debates over the nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to the 
Supreme Court, many politicians and some scholars professed to find the idea of natural law 
troubling, apparently confusing natural law with specifically religious teachings. See, for exam· 
pie, Laurence H. Tribe, "Natural Law" and the Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1991, at AIS, 
and my response, Michael W. McConnell, Trashing Natural Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1991, at 
A23. 
12. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 176. 
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gorical denial that the ought is inferable from the is, and - as will be 
seen below - an important strain of Reformed Protestantism denies 
that any inferences about the good can be drawn from the character of 
a fallen world. But even though not everyone can share its premises, 
natural law methodology is "accessible" in the sense that the evidence 
on which it rests is equally discernible, in principle, by all persons 
without reference to any idiosyncrasies of creed, culture, or 
perspective. 
Catholic teaching on abortion is based squarely on natural law, not 
on revelation. "Catholic doctrine takes abortion to be a violation of 
natural law, which means that understanding it to be a wrong should 
not require Christian faith or church authority" (pp. 35-36). In this 
sense, the claim in Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion in Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services 13 that anti-abortion laws are "theologi-
cal" is based on a mistaken understanding of Catholic teaching. "En-
soulment" is just a way of talking about humanity, and in its reliance 
on Aristotelian biology, the Church was not being "theological" but 
simply incorporating into its ethics the best science of its day. That is 
why, with the nineteenth-century advances in knowledge of human 
embryology, the Church intensified its opposition to abortions of pre-
quickening fetuses. 
Having made that point, the authors do not pause to wonder: , If 
Catholic natural law thinking is entirely based on natural reason, what 
does this have to say about the value of religious participation in pub-
lic policy? Does this not suggest that, even within the Church, serious 
ethical philosophers consider it necessary to divorce themselves from 
the distinctively religious aspect of knowledge - that is, revelation -
and to rely on that aspect of knowledge in which the Christian, the 
Jew, and the infidel stand on an equal footing? In their defense of 
religious participation in public deliberation, have not the authors in-
advertently denigrated the importance of theology? One might con-
clude that while natural law is a permissible basis for public 
deliberation, sacred writings and spiritual associations have nothing 
distinctive to contribute. Perhaps the richness of ethical deliberation 
within the various religious communities is a product, not of their 
character as religious, but of their character as ethical communities -
communities that devote themselves to ethical questions, that have a 
certain, albeit incomplete, insulation from passing fads and earthly au-
thorities, and that take seriously both the claims of the past and their 
obligations to the future. Perhaps God has nothing to do with it. 
This question arises again - though without explicit commentary 
from the authors - in the chapter on Protestant fundamentalists and 
evangelicals.14 This is a remarkable chapter in its ability to see the 
13. 492 U.S. 490, 568 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
14. Pp. 74-82. The authors use the term fundamentalist to describe a movement within 
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world from the perspective of a group that is almost completely unrep-
resented and frequently derided in academic circles. In elite circles, 
fundamentalists are generally thought to be ignorant, irrational, emo-
tional, and lacking in independence. In a revealing incident last year, 
the Washington Post stated in a front-page news story that fundamen-
talists "are largely poor, uneducated and easy to command" - an of-
fensive generalization that it retracted the next day. 15 In fact, 
fundamentalism is highly rationalistic, individualistic, and distrustful 
of emotion as a guide to right conduct. As Mensch and Freeman note, 
"[d]espite common misconception, biblical inerrancy, or fundamental-
ism, does not represent a retreat from science to blind irrationalism" 
(p. 78). The goal of fundamentalist theology, they say, quoting 
Princeton theologian Charles Hodge, is to "gain the 'assent to the 
truth, or the persuasion of the mind.' " 16 They quote J. Gresham 
Machen, the Presbyterian theologian expelled from Princeton after the 
victory of liberal theology: 
"Theology ... is just as much a science as is chemistry ... [. T]he two 
sciences, it is true, differ widely in their subject matter; they differ widely 
in the character of the evidence upon which these conclusions are based; 
in particular they differ widely in the qualifications required of the inves-
tigator: but they are both sciences, because they are both concerned with 
the acquisition and orderly arrangement of a body of truth."17 
The implications of this Bible-centered world view are individualistic, 
because no human agent may come between the believer and the Word 
- thus resulting in a theological egalitarianism - and rationalistic, 
because the believer must apply the rational faculty of reading and 
understanding to gain access to the perfect Word of God and must 
distrust his own emotion and instinct, which are products of a fallen 
nature. As a historical matter, one c~ see the liberal democratic or-
der as a product of this Protestant doctrine - democracy being the 
"priesthood of all believers" in the political sphere. 
Unlike natural law, the fundamentalist world view is based on rev-
elation as the only entirely reliable source of knowledge, coupled with 
Protestant Christianity that, under their definition, embraces most evangelicals as well. Both 
fundamentalists and evangelicals are inerrantists, meaning that they accept absolutely the truth 
of the Bible as it came from God. Evangelicals, however, are not committed to a literalist herme· 
neutic. For convenience' sake, I will adopt the authors' practice of using the termfundamental· 
ist to embrace both, but with some trepidation, for the termfundamentalist is often used as a 
term of opprobrium. I do not mean it as such, and neither (I think) do Mensch and Freeman. 
15. Michael Weisskopf, Energized by Pulpit of Passion, the Public Is Calling; "Gospel Grape· 
vine" Displays Strength in Controversy over Military Gay Ban, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1993, at Al, 
AlO. The next day, the newspaper admitted that "[t]here is no factual basis for that statement." 
Corrections, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1993, at A3. In the retraction, the paper reported that, accord-
ing to a nationwide poll, 38% of .Americans identifying themselves as "Evangelical-Born Again" 
Christians had some college education, as compared to 45% of all Americans. Id. 
16. P. 78 (quoting Forrest M. Baird, Shaeffer's Intellectual Roots, in REFLECTIONS ON 
FRANCIS SCHAEFFER 45, 47 (Ronald W. Ruegsegger ed., 1986) (quoting Charles Hodge)), 
17. Pp. 78-79 (quoting Baird, supra note 16, at 53 (quoting J. Gresham Machen)). 
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empirical observations about the world, in the tradition of Scottish 
"Common Sense" philosophy. Fundamentalism thus raises two inter-
esting and important questions that the authors do not address. First 
is a question of interpretation: To what extent is fundamentalist 
teaching against abortion based on revelation? From an internal per-
spective, the answer is that it is entirely based on revelation, but this 
may be because of the powerful way in which students of a particular 
text are able to use it to illuminate the world. In fact, the ;iuthors 
point out that the scriptural texts cited in support of the pro-life posi-
tion are less than determinate (p. 17). From a Biblical perspective, it is 
difficult to see the abortion question "as one of private rights alone" 
(p. 17), but that does not obviate discussion of the content of the an-
swer (what ate the roles of excuse, justification, enforceability, and 
prudence?). In other words, those who take the Bible's injunctions 
regarding the value of life seriously will be unlikely to buy the privacy 
argument (that ~bortion does not present a question of public justice) 
but need not necessarily insist on criminal prohibitions in all cases 
from the moment of conception, any more than they must oppose cap-
ital punishment or favor extensive welfare programs. It may well be 
that fundamentalists derive their normative premises from Scripture 
but their empirical and prudential data from elsewhere. 
My own impression of evangelical thinking about abortion is that, 
for most, abortion presents a quite simple and straightforward ques-
tion of justice, much like infanticide, and that evangelicals tend to as-
sume that the denial by pro-choice advocates of what appear to be 
obvious facts of life is attributable to pride and selfishness rather than 
to any conscientious doubt that an unborn child is a child. This means 
that the contribution of evangelicals to the pro-life movement has been 
more in their commitment ~d determination than in their ability to 
communicate and convince outsiders. 
The second question is whether the reliance by some citizens on 
revelation is problematic within our constitutional order. As on the 
issue of authority within the Catholic tradition, the authors have sur-
prisingly little to say about the question of revelation within Protes-
tantism - perhaps because, in their judgment, most religious 
deliberation is less reliant on mere authority or revelation than it may 
appear. At first blush, an appeal to revealed truth may appear to be 
less "universalistic" - less "accessible" - than reliance on natural 
law, because not everyone accepts the Bible as the source of revealed 
truth. The fundamentalist, however, has a powerful response. The 
fundamentalist would point out that God's revelation through the Bi-
ble is to all persons and not to a select subset of the population and 
that there are good reasons why all rational persons, if fully informed 
and able to evaluate the matter dispassionately - that is to say, free of 
the blinders of sin - could and should accept the Bible as truth. That 
some persons do not presently agree with the premise of the funda-
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mentalist argument does not make the argument any less universal or 
accessible. If we waited for a set of premises to which everyone could 
agree, we would be waiting forever. Indeed, many rational individuals 
deny the essential premise of natural law - that nature is normative. 
Does that mean that natural law is not accessible to all? 
In any event, it is striking that the more rationalistic strains of 
Christianity have tended to take the hardest line against abortion. 
This is not true of the modern Reformed tradition, most powerfully 
represented by Karl Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. This tradition, as 
the authors point out, is "peculiarly Christian" and "stubbornly sec-
tarian" (p. 48), yet more equivocal on the issue of abortion. The great 
Barmen Declaration of the German Confessing Church, drafted by 
Barth, "repudiates" the idea that citizens can and should base their 
judgments about questions of justice on something other than the com-
prehensive doctrines they deem to be true: "We repudiate the false 
teaching that there are areas of our life in which we belong not to 
Jesus Christ but another Lord, areas in which we do not need justifica-
tion and sanctification through him."18 Barth strenuously criticizes 
the very idea of natural law: How can observation of the characteris-
tics of a fallen world tell us anything about the will of a perfect God? 
Even more than fundamentalism, which tends to assume that God's 
revelation through Scripture is ultimately identical to His revelation 
through the natural world, Barth's radical Protestantism posits a dis-
junction between revelation and natural reason. 
Much of the impulse behind the postwar natural law movement 
was the brush with a universal evil and the recognition (at Nuremberg 
and elsewhere) of the limits of positive law. It is therefore something 
of a shock to learn that "the only serious institutional Christian oppo-
sition to Hitler in Germany arose, not on the basis of natural law, but 
rather quite explicitly and emphatically in the context of rejecting nat-
ural law" (pp. 46-47). At a time when mainstream German Protes-
tantism, invoking natural law, was reconciled to Hitler, Barth was 
banished and Bonhoeffer executed for their theologically uncompro-
mising opposition to the Nazi regime. As Mensch and Freeman ex-
plain, Barth recognized that "if church and culture were too bound 
together by the link of a natural law theology, then contingent human 
projects (politics, science, cultural traditions) could claim the status of 
ontological reality, not subject to God's revealed word" (p. 55). 
In other words, the very willingness of German Protestants to as-
similate their ethics into the overlapping consensus of German culture 
deprived them of their vantage point for descrying the coming evil of 
18. P. 49 (quoting EDWIN H. ROBERTSON, THE SHAME AND THE SACRIFICE: THE LIFE 
AND TEACHING OF DIETRICH BONHOEFFER 117 (1988) (quoting THE BARMEN THEOLOGICAL 
DECLARATION (1934), reprinted in EBERHARD JONGEL, CHRISf, JUSTICE AND PEACE at xxi (D. 
Bruce Hamill & Alan J. Torrance trans., T.&T. Clark 1992) (DECLARATION translated by Doug-
las S. Bax))). 
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Nazism. By the same token, the sectarianism of Barth and Bonhoeffer 
insulated them and their fellow radical Christians from being co-
opted. The radically unsecular character of Barthian thought is cap-
tured in this excellent summary: 
Could one reject abstract normative categories, whether derived from 
natural law or the secularized rationalism of Kant, and nevertheless 
fashion an ethics that would require responsible action in the world? 
The answer for both Barth and Bonhoeffer lay not in ethics itself (based 
on a supposed knowledge of the world and the operation of human rea-
son), but in theology - in the dialectical process of looking first "up-
ward," as it were, to the command of God, which is a divinely initiated 
and revealed claim, the call to the covenant "I-Thou" relationship, and 
then downward, to a particular person in a particular context. The con-
tent of the command is known only by virtue of another dialectic - that 
of incarnation and redemption - so that the (impossible) command is 
always accompanied by the promise of grace .... [pp. 56-57] 
In Barthian theology, there is no danger of becoming so universal-
ized that God ceases to be of importance. According to the authors' 
exegesis of Barth, "only God, not 'natural' human beings, made the 
correct operation of reason in nature possible" (p. 55). In Barth's 
words, quoted by the authors, " '[R]eason, if left entirely without 
grace, is incurably sick and incapable of any serious theological activ-
ity. Only when it has been illumined, or at least provisionally shone 
upon by faith,' can it produce statements of truth about the human 
and natural world .... " 19 In Barth's hand this is not an attack on 
science but rather a sophisticated epistemology strikingly akin to mod-
em, nonpositivistic philosophy of science.20 The authors comment: 
"Modem science does, in fact, resemble sophisticated theology more 
than it resembles the elaborate claims of certainty that are more typi-
cal of Newtonian physics, and too often, ironically, of social science as 
well" (p. 54). In Barth's view, "all scientific knowledge is necessarily 
contingent, with its particular methodology suited to its own specific 
object of study,'' and "all science is rooted in a faith that the object of 
study will reveal itself, at least provisionally, through the method fash-
ioned by scientists within their traditions" (pp. 53-54). According to 
Barth, theology "knows itself to rest on sheer contingency"21 - but in 
this it is no different from any other field of knowledge. Positivism is 
erroneous in both theology and science. 
Fundamentalism and Barthian neo-orthodoxy thus start from sim-
ilar premises about the primacy of revelation and have similar aspira-
19. Pp. 55-56 (quoting KARL BARTH, Nol: Answer to Emil Bronner (1934), reprinted in 
NATURAL THEOLOGY 65, 96 (Peter Fraenkel trans., photo. reprint 1962) (1946)). 
20. See p. 54. 
21. P. 54 (quoting Harold Nebelsick, Karl Barth's Understanding of Science, in THEOLOGY 
BEYOND CHRISTENDOM: EssAYS ON THE CENTENARY OF THE BIRTH OF KARL BARTH, MAY 
10, 1886, at 165, 182 (John Thompson ed., 1986) (quoting Karl Barth)). 
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tions to a "scientific" quality, but there the resemblance ends. 
Fundamentalism, with its Common Sense philosophy, resembles posi-
tivist science in its pursuit of objective truth. Neo-orthodoxy, with its 
antifoundationalist epistemology, lives comfortably in a postmodern 
intellectual universe. 
Barth rejects the casuistical method of natural lawyers. It is not 
possible, according to Barth, to move from particular texts, norms, or 
objective categories to universal rules that could govern the "plenitude 
of conditions and possibilities."22 Indeed, not only is this "logically 
impossible," but it leads both to "unwarranted arrogance" - to set 
oneself up as the judge of good and evil in the place of God - and to 
the destruction of human freedom (p. 58). The "casuist ethics" of the 
natural lawyers "calls a person away from real responsibility" (p. 58). 
For Barth and Bonhoeffer, "the gospel" - not natural reason - "was 
the core of ethics - the command that is fulfilled by the life lived 
wholly for the neighbor" (p. 57). This ethics cannot be worked out in 
rules or confined to regulations; it requires a kind of selflessness that is 
possible only through the joyous submission of the believer to the will 
of God. In Bonhoeffer's words, "[i]t is evident that the only appropri-
ate conduct of men before God is the doing of His will."23 Our "rela-
tion to God is a new life in 'existence for others,' through participation 
in the being of Jesus. The transcendental is not infinite and unattaina-
ble tasks, but the neighbor who is within reach in any given 
situation."24 
Although they give other perspectives respectful consideration, 
Mensch and Freeman are apparently most impressed with the pos-
sibilities of Reformed Protestantism as a basis for moral deliberation. 
This tradition, they find, is best able to "reject the pressure to conform 
to the rest of culture or to produce false moral universals" and to 
"concentrate instead on a thick description of its own tradition" (pp. 
145-46). In this theology they find it possible to avoid the "stark 
choice" between "ecumenical 'publicness,' on the one hand, and sec-
tarian 'privateness,' on the other" (p. 145). Paradoxically, the least 
universal and accessible theology produces the most open and produc-
tive political theology. 
III 
The implications of this school of thought for the question of abor-
22. P. 57 (quoting 3 KARL BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS pt. 4, § 52, at 9-10 (G.W. 
Bromitey & T.F. Torrance eds. & A.T. Mackey et al. trans., T.&T. Clark 1961) (1951)). 
23. P. 62 (quoting DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, ETHICS 166 (Eberhard Bethge ed. & Neville H. 
Smith trans., SCM Press 1955) (1949)). 
24. Pp. 62-63 (quoting Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Outline for a Book, in LETIERS AND PAPERS 
FROM PRISON 210, 210 (Eberhard Bethge ed. & Reginald Fuller et al. trans., SCM Press, 3d ed. 
rev. & enl. 1967) (1964)). 
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tion are not obvious. As the authors point out, neither Barth nor 
Bonhoeffer "offered a clear-cut ethical rule" governing the subject (p. 
63). Their position might, however, be described as "anti-choice," 
though not "pro-life."2s 
The pro-choice celebration of the autonomous self is plainly anti-
thetical to the ethics of Reformed Protestantism. It is in this sense 
that I call them "anti-choice." Celebration of the self and its indepen-
dence of any obligation not voluntarily assumed elevates the human 
being to the place of God at the center of the normative universe and 
epitomizes the alienation from God's will that is the essence of sin. As 
the authors explain, quoting Barth, "[T]he command of God is an ap-
peal to freedom - not a freedom of 'choice, preference, or selection' 
but (again paradoxically) the freedom of obedience."26 In this 
Bonhoeffer, like Barth, could sound very much like his Calvinist intel-
lectual forebears: 
[T]he only appropriate conduct of men before God is the doing of His 
will. The sermon on the mount is there for the purpose of being done. 
Only in doing can there be submission to the will of God. In doing 
God's will, man renounces every right and every justification of his own 
••• • 21 
One might therefore expect Reformed Protestant ethicists to join 
with natural lawyers and fundamentalists in forthright opposition to 
abortion. An ethics of subordination of the self and service to the 
other - an ethics of self-sacrifice in imitation of the suffering of Christ 
on the cross - should, one would think, see nothing but negation and 
alienation in the practice of abortion. 28 This is especially true because, 
in the crucible of Nazism, this school of thought came to recognize the 
grave dangers of categorical relegation of some biological humans to 
the ranks of the less-than-fully human. As Barth stated, "[E]veryone 
should treat his existence and that of every other human being with 
respect. For it belongs to God. It is His loan and blessing."29 Some-
what surprisingly, however, Barth and Bonhoeffer drew back from a 
categorical condemnation of what Barth called "the wicked violation 
25. This is my characterization, not the authors'. 
26. P. 58 (quoting 3 BARTH, supra note 22, pt. 4, § 52, at 13). 
27. P. 62 (quoting BONHOEFFER, supra note 23, at 166). 
28. One could imagine a Reformed Protestant ethic in combination with a libertarian view of 
government, producing the view that abortion is wrong but that government should do nothing 
about it. The possibility of a libertarian political theology is not explored in The Politics of 
Virtue. In the case of Reformed Protestantism as it has developed from Calvin through Barth 
and Bonhoeffer, it would be entirely out of place, for this tradition has always seen the govern-
ment as a powerful instrument for the achievement of social justice. The selective libertarianism 
of pro-choice Protestant denominations seems merely expedient, as they appear to have a perfec-
tionist view of politics in every area but this. Those who would use government coercion to 
eradicate racism, selfishness, and other sinful attitudes and behaviors have a difficult time ex-
plaining why the treatment of the unborn is a private matter. 
29. P. 63 (quoting 3 BARTH, supra note 22, pt. 4, § 55, at 340). 
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of the sanctity of human life which is always seriously at issue in abor-
tion. "30 Barth called the absolute condemnation of abortion "horribly 
respectable" and "[n]ever sparing in its extreme demands on wo-
men."31 As Mensch and Freeman put it, "God's commandment with 
respect to abortion is, for Barth, a resolute 'No,' [but] it is a 'No' to be 
engaged dialectically by human freedom and conscience" (p. 64). In 
his posthumously published Ethics, Bonhoeffer described abortion as 
"nothing but murder"; for a "nascent human being has been deliber-
ately deprived of his life."32 But, he adds, "[a] great many different 
motives may lead to an action of this kind; indeed in cases where it is 
an act of despair, performed in circumstances of extreme human or 
economic destitution and misery, the guilt may often lie rather with 
the community than with the individual."33 
Mensch and Freeman obviously believe that the theological ethics 
of Barth and Bonhoeffer offers the most promising avenue toward a 
principled middle-ground resolution of the abortion question. Despite 
their sometimes arcane exposition and starkly theocentric world view, 
these theologians suggest a posture toward abortion strikingly congru-
ent with popular opinion: most people consider abortion the taking of 
a human life - often embracing even the term murder - but also 
believe that there are circumstances serious enough to justify or at 
least excuse it.34 From either the pro-choice or the pro-life perspec-
tive, this seems hopelessly muddled and contradictory. There may, 
however, be wisdom in it. From the Reformed Protestant perspective, 
there is no escaping the fallen human condition. Mensch and Free-
man explain, quoting Barth and Bonhoeffer, that 
"[a]n ethics cannot be a book in which there is set out how everything in 
the world actually ought to be but unfortunately is not," for it is the 
"unfortunately is not" which is the whole point. It is precisely in the 
real, creaturely world, the world as it is, a fallen world, that decisions 
must be made. 35 
We must never, never treat the taking of human life - even nascent 
human life - as a "private" matter of no concern to the just society; 
30. P. 64 (quoting 3 BARTH, supra note 22, pt. 4, § 55, at 417). 
31. Id. (quoting 3 BARTH, supra note 22, pt. 4, § 55, at 417). 
32. Id. (quoting BONHOEFFER, supra note 23, at 131). 
33. Id. (quoting BONHOEFFER, supra note 23, at 131). 
34. An intensive investigation of public attitudes toward abortion and related issues con· 
ducted by the Gallup Organization under the direction of sociologist James Davison Hunter on 
behalf of Americans United for Life found that forty-nine percent of respondents consider abor-
tion "murder" and another twenty-eight percent consider it "the taking of human life." See 2 
THE GALLUP 0RG., INC., GALLUP ORGANIZATION SURVEY ON THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY 
IN AMERICA tbl. 29 (Summer 1990). On the other hand, polls consistently show that about 
three-quarters of the population would allow abortions in at least some serious situations in 
addition to cases involving threats to the life of the mother. 
35. P. 57 (quoting 3 BARTH, supra note 22, pt. 4, § 52, at 10 (quoting BONHOEFFER, supra 
note 23, at 236)) (footnote omitted). 
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nor may we whitewash the reality of abortion with euphemisms about 
"tissue" and the "woman's own body." Abortion is an evil, all too 
frequently and casually employed for the destruction of life. But the 
pregnant woman in distress is one's neighbor, too. Elimination of 
abortion may be the goal, but criminal punishment need not necessar-
ily be the means. 
It would have been helpful, at this juncture, for the authors to be 
more specific about the possibilities for principled compromise. The 
Reformed Protestant position, with its paradoxes and dialectics, does 
not translate easily into public policy. Barth and Bonhoeffer ad-
dressed the abortion question in the context of personal ethics and 
pastoral guidance, where individual, case-by-case examinations of cir-
cumstances, motivations, and sincerity are both possible and inevita-
ble. The law necessarily must be more categorical - more "legalistic" 
and "casuistical." Barth and Bonhoeffer were concerned with sin, for-
giveness, and grace, while the law is concerned, first and foremost, 
with justice. 
Mensch and Freeman are a compelling voice for a principled mid-
dle way on an issue for which such voices are few in number. The 
American people, despite decades of largely absolutist rhetoric from 
both sides, continue to cleave to the middle ground on abortion, yet 
virtually no figure in public life has sought to define and clarify that 
middle ground or to provide leadership to get there. President Clinton 
has stated that he wants abortion to be "safe, legal and rare,"36 but all 
he has done is make it cheaper and more respectable. With one and 
one-half million abortions per year - many of them not "chosen" by 
the woman but forced on her by circumstances beyond her control and 
lack of knowledge about alternatives - there would seem to be plenty 
of room for action that would help to make abortions more "rare." 
Unfortunately, in the absence of such actions, the rights rhetoric of 
the pro-choice movement serves only to place a collective stamp of 
approval on what should be understood as a great social injustice to 
the unborn, as well as an avoidable tragedy to the mothers who have 
had abortions. 37 The sanctification of abortion as a constitutional 
right has contributed to the perception that abortion is a morally and 
socially appropriate form of birth control. This is intolerable. The 
first object of social policy in this area should be to reduce the number 
of abortions chosen by women: not to eliminate their choice, but to 
36. See Kevin Sack, Protester Thrusts Fetus at a Surprised Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 
1992, at Al 1. 
37. Anyone who doubts that abortion is a tragedy for the mother - putting aside the inter-
ests of the child- should consult MAGDA DENES, IN NECESSITY AND SORROW (1976); KATH-
LEEN McDONNELL, NOT AN EASY CHOICE (1984); or MARY K. ZIMMERMAN, PASSAGE 
THROUGH ABORTION: THE PERSONAL AND SOCIAL REALITY OF WOMEN'S EXPERIENCES 
(1977). All of these books are pro-choice, but they recognize the horror of the experience of 
taking the life of one's unborn child and its effects on women. 
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affect what choice they make. Abortion is at least as serious a social 
problem as tobacco. 
There is a serious danger - evident in the pronouncements of the 
mainline Protestant denominations on the abortion question - that 
the "compromise" that comes from Reformed Protestant teaching can 
consist of paying lip service to the sanctity of life while doing nothing 
about the practice. This is essentially the West European solution 
(coupled with some more serious protection for fetal life in the later 
stages of pregnancy than we have here), and it seems to satisfy most 
people. Let us abolish the "right" of abortion discovered in Roe, de-
clare that all life is deserving of protection, and then do nothing about 
it. Under this approach, the protesters, I predict, would diminish 
greatly in number; the Supreme Court's docket would be cleared of 
these contentious cases; politicians would be off the hook; but the 
number of abortions would stay the same. If there is a principled mid-
dle-ground position, it must lie in a noncoercive pro-life policy that 
works. 
CONCLUSION 
The title of this book is The Politics of Virtue. This seems to me an 
almost complete misnomer, for few, if any, of the serious theologians 
whose ideas inspire the book believe that politics is about virtue or that 
government can create virtue. Barth and Bonhoeffer speak not of vir-
tue but of sin and grace - of suffering, sacrifice, and redemption, 
which are very different things than virtue. The only reference to vir-
tue in the text of the book, to my recollection, is in a discussion of 
Aquinas, and for Aquinas the relation between law ("politics") and 
virtue is imperfect at best: 
Now human law is laid down for the multitude the major part of which 
is composed of men not perfected by virtue. Consequently, all and every 
vice, from which virtuous men abstain, is not prohibited by human law 
but only the gravest vicious actions, from which it is possible for the 
major part of the multitude to abstain, and mainly those - like homi-
cide, theft, etc. - which are harmful to others, and without the prohibi-
tion of which human society could not be preserved. 38 
Laws against abortion are designed not to produce virtue but to pre-
vent injustice. 
The subtitle of the book, Is Abortion Debatable?, is more to the 
point. By "debatable," the authors presumably mean that abortion is 
an issue about which debate is both possible and useful. I do not think 
that anyone will come away from this book persuaded of any particu-
lar thesis or program regarding abortion. I do think, though, that 
readers will be in a better position to see why even persons who share 
38. P. 38 (quoting JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 168 n.24 (1951) (quoting 
Thomas Aquinas)). 
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the authors' liberal-left, feminist world view should understand the 
abortion issue as a question of justice - not simply of privacy or op-
pression - and even those of a secular orientation will be able to see 
how theological voices can contribute to the debate. Perhaps the first 
step toward having a productive debate - and hence toward finding a 
peaceful democratic solution - is to listen to one another's arguments 
and to stop attempting to rule "out-of-bounds" those whose presup-
positions are grounded in religious faith. 
